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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

GIBBONS & REED CO~IP ANY, a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-vs.-

Case No. 7850

S. Y. GUTHRIE, ADAM K. GRAFE
and ROBERT I. LUDWIG,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants and defendants appeal from a judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
awarding Gibbons & Reed Company, a Utah corporation,
plaintiff and respondent, damages of $12,356.75, plus
interest at 6% from March 18, 1951.
The action in the lower court was founded on contract as set forth in the complaint. (R. 1) *. Complaint
alleged $15,356.75 damages (R. 1, 2) and the evidence
proved damages of $15,383.82 (R. 285) less $50.00 (R.
*Note : "R" refers to red numbers at bottom of transcript.
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140) for a total of $15,333.82. The damages consisted of
expenses and costs (R. 84 & 85) incurred by the respondent in moving equipment in and out to the job in Garfield
County from Salt Lake City and in furnishing supplies
and materials and labor to perform said contract for the
convenience of appellants (R. 69-71) for the period as set
forth in the complaint. (R. 1). See exhibit B for items
of expenses and costs. (R. 75, 76, 106-113, 128-145).
Respondent had the burden of proving the allegations of its complaint, all material allegations of which
were admitted by appellants in its second defense with
the exception of respondent's damages. (R. 5-6).
Appellants had the burden of proving the allegations
of their affirmative defense. (R. 6-14).
The primary issues in the lower court were :
a.
b.
c.

Whether plaintiff (respondent) proved damages as set forth in the complaint.
The terms of the parol agreement between the
parties.
Whether defendants (appellants) sustained
the burden of their affirmative defense, and if
so, was the affirmative defense sufficient to
deny the plaintiff (respondent) recovery under the allegations, admissions and evidence
supporting the proof of the complaint.

The facts as presented by appellants in their brief
are not complete and accordingly respondent submits
the following more complete statement of facts.
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FACTS
The respondent, Gibbons & Reed Company is a Utah
corporation with 40 years experience in Utah as a heavy
engineering, highway and building contractor. (R. 44, 45 1
47, 48 & 180). The appellant S. Y. Guthrie is a resident
of Dallas, Texas, (R. 43) with experience as a mechani~al
processing, piping, heating and refrigeration contractor
(R. 272, 273) and knew the Gibbons & Reed Company
to be a reliable general construction firm. (R. 273). The
appellant Adam K. Grafe is also a resident of Dallas,
Texas, also having had prior satisfactory experience with
respondent (R. 180) and having had many years experience in the mining business. ( R. 146).
Grafe, Guthrie and one other person, Thomas J.
Bate, the latter person over whom respondent was unsuccessful in securing service of summons (R. 39, 40)
were partners engaged in mining uranium in the Henry
:Mountain ~lining District of Garfield County, Utah. (R.
39-42). This action arose over said mining venture.
The appellants entered into an agreement with respondent, which in the words of appellant Guthrie was an
oral agreement (R. 43) and was neither a cost-plus, lump
sum or a unit price contract (R. 44), but was an oral contract consisting of a proposal (Exhibit A), which was
an estimate of ultimate costs according to appellants
(Plaintiff's interrogatories, No. 4 (R. 20) and defendants' answer No. 4 in Exhibit 13). The terms of said
agreement included certain preliminary road building
and camp building construction in addition to an approximate schedule for drilling, drifting into ore bodies,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stripping and moving ore, (R. 196, 197 and 183, line 6,
289, 292). The ultimate objective was to enable appellants by April 15 to determine if there was sufficient
ore in said claims to warrant appellants taking up an
option with a Mr. L. R. Weeks for the lease and operation of said claims, (R. 153). Said proposal (Exhibit
A) also listed the costs of operation for the work to be
undertaken and an option allowing appellants to terminate at any time. Appellants agreed to this proposal
(R. 158) without subsequent disapproval, (R. 183). Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the production of any ore, appellants now contend that respondents are required to have produced enough ore to partly
pay for the costs of the job. Even if this contention were
so, respondents did produce a substantial amount of ore
to partly defray the said expenses. (R. 214) (Exhibit
11).
Respondent was only interested in performing thiioi
exploratory mining work for appellants in order to put
respondent in a more favored position to secure a contract for the construction of a large ore processing mill
at Green River, Utah, which was being considered by appellant. (R. 52, 53, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 78). As a matter
of fact, the only motivating factor to promote respondent
to such a generous offer was the prospect for additional
work, from appellants. (R. 77 and 78).
Under the terms of said oral agreement, respondent, Gibbons & Reed Company, furnished the equipment
for the operation, at the rental rates set forth in respondent's proposal (Exhibit A) (R. 57 and 58); said rental
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rates were reasonable and below the recognized rates
of the Associated Equipment Distributors, (R. 118).
Respondent paid for the necessary supplies, materials
and parts that went into said operation including the
foodstuffs and assmned the payroll for all workmen
hired by Harold Ecker. (R. 55 and 56). Appellant Grafe
inforn1ed George Jones, agent for respondent, that
Harold Ecker, long time resident of Wayne County, was
the only really qualified person to conduct the mining
operation in this Henry niountain Uranium venture, (R.
50, 82, 83 and 8±) and for this reason said Ecker was to
supervise the job, hire the employees (R. 61 and 62)
and all employees were carried on the payroll of respondents. :Jir. Ludwig, agent of appellants instructed respondents also to place ~Ir. Robert Deming, a geologist,
upon the payroll (R. 91 and 92). All personnel remained
with appellants after the Gibbons & Reed contract terminated and its equipment removed (R. 187).
Gibbons & Reed commenced work at the request of
the appellants (R. 156) on February 9, 1951. (Exhibit
I). However, equipment did not move on to the job until
February 19, 1951, because Gibbons & Reed was threatened with a trespass action (R. 59, 60, 233 and 234) by the
Lessor of the property, L. R. Weeks. Thereafter the
heavy equipment was sent to the job after having been
inspected at respondent's shop at Salt Lake City, Utah,
(R. 86, 103 and 104) arriving at the job on February
25, 1951. (Exhibit F).
Thereafter in accordance with said agreement the
respondent, Gibbons & Reed Co. constructed, roads,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

buildings, drilled test holes, ripped and stripped overburden and drifted into ore bodies, furnishing the
machinery, labor and supplies therefor. That notwithstanding adverse weather and physical conditions, the
respondent performed pursuant to said contract, reasonably, substantially and sufficiently to enable appellants
to undertake the option with L. R. Weeks, even though
appellants terminated the contract at the halfway point.
Those persons on the job from day to day all recognized that the construction of roads, buildings, stripping,
drilling and production of ore was accomplished from
February 9, 1951 until March 12, 1951.
Robert Deming geologist who made reports on the
progress of the job stated that the work was satisfactory
(Dem. dep. 62) and that respondent's equipment was
appropriate, (Dem. dep. 74).
Harold Ecker, appellants' witness stated that preliminary work was accomplished including stripping,
drilling and building cabins, even before the heavy D-8
cat* of Gibbons & Reed arrived on the job. (R. 242 and
243).
Verl Boyer, the cat operator, stated that the opera~
tions were normal for such construction work. (R. 98).
Appellant Grafe himself stated that certain prelimi~
nary work was necessary and that Gibbons and Reed had
performed same. (R. 196 and 197) and (R. 183, line 6).
By appellants' Exhibit 11 some 15.5 tons of ore were
shipped from the job on March 19 to March 31 and that
*Note: Largest Caterpillar tractor manufactured with dozer
blade on front end and control unit behind.
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some 37.S tons were shipped fron1 :March 31 to Aprill-l.
Contradictory to this, however, appellant Grafe stated
that all ore was 1nerely stockpiled on job from F'ebruary
15 until April15, (R. 21-l) and admittedly 15 tons at least
was frmn efforts of Gibbons and Reed. (R. 214). However, since no ore was produced by appellants before
April 18 (Dem. dep. 60 and 72) all of this ore shipped,
totaling son1e 60 tons, could only have been produced by
Gibbons & Reed prior to the tern1ination of said contract
on March 12.
As conclusive evidence of the completeness of the
work of Gibbons & Reed is the fact that the appellants
exercised their option on April 15, (R. 192), having
done little, if any, work since Gibbons and Reed were
ordered fron1 the job. As stated by appellant Grafe (R.
153):
"I told them that was the essence of our wanting any work done down on the leases at all, was
to give us the required information to see whether
we would, within the deadline of our option (April
15, 1951) exercise such option and take over the
leases."
During the performance of the work by Gibbons and
Reed, daily and current reports of the labor, supplies and
material costs were sent to Gibbons and Reed, (Dem. dep.
66-69) (R. 246) and said costs were paid by Gibbons and
Reed, (R. 107-112, 131, 142-144), and currently entered in
the books. (Exhibits B and C).
Notwithstanding reasonable and substantial performance of the work, appellants Grafe and Guthrie visited
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the job on March 12, 1951, found the D-8 cat and the
large compressor temporarily not working and summarily
terminated the contract. Appellants erroneously concluded that said equipment was beyond repair. The D-8
cat had only four small bolts broken, which could have
been repaired in two to four hours (R. 97 and 286),
and the cmnpressor could have been repaired in fifteen
minutes by letting air out of the line (R. 286). Boyer,
the D-8 cat operator, a competent heavy equipment
mechanic, told appellants the cause of the breakdown
and requested that parts be sent for (R. 98 and 102).
Harold Ecker, Adam Grafe, and S. Y. Guthrie were not
mechanics, and admittedly unqualified to judge the
mechanical condition of equipment. As stated by Boyer,
the usual number of parts and tools were available on
the job, it not being usual to have on hand on such a job
every required small part, particularly the said small
bolts that caused the breakdown. (R. 101). Many parts
and tools were supplied. (Dem. dep. 37).
Had the appellants been interested in continuing the
job with Gibbons and Reed, they could have phoned from
the C.A.A. field for the missing parts or could have
instructed Boyer on his trip to Salt Lake City to procure
the parts. Appellants declined to follow this approach.
(R. 276 and 210).
Thereafter on the 14th day of March, 1951, Gibbons
and Reed was notified that their entire operation would
be discontinued as of March 18, (R. 64), and the appellants would get their own equipment to use down on the
job. (R. 65). Appellants then acquired a D-6 cat from
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Bates, one of the partners which arrived on the job April
8 and a traxcavator which arrived on the job April 18,
both pieces of equipment being new and both pieces of
equip1nent broke down several times delaying the job. (R.
203, :20±), (De1n. dep. 63, 6±). Appellants continued
Ecker and all of the employees on their payroll. Appellant's expended less n1an hours from ~larch 19 until April
1-! than Gibbons & Reed expended from February 8 to
March 12, the date of termination. As stated by Deming,
(Dem dep. 60 and 72) appellants did not get into full
swing until April 18, 1951, and that no ore was produced
by appellants until July, 1951. Because of the great
delay from 1\'Iarch 12 to April 8, most employees thought
the job was folding up. (Dem. dep. 60). However, the
appellants exercised their option with L. R. Weeks on
April15, 1951, which proved the performance by Gibbons
& Reed was satisfactory.
The facts may be accurately summarized as follows:
Gibbons & Reed pursuant to an agreed schedule of
costs undertook at the request of appellants certain
preliminary and exploratory work for appellants to enable appellants to determine the feasibility of taking up
an option with L. R. Weeks on the subject mining claims.
Notwithstanding inclement weather, a threat of trespass
action, the necessity of building roads and buildings,
respondent Gibbons & Reed Company had within onehalf the alloted 60 day option time drilled, stripped and
drifted sufficiently to allow appellants with very little,
if any, additional work to exercise their option, thereby
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accomplishing the object for which the work was undertaken.
Appellants benefited by respondent's work without
one cent reimbursement to Gibbons & Reed for costs
expended. Appellants terminated said contract at a
point when Gibbons & Reed had substantially accomplished its purpose. Appellants then attempting to relieve
themselves of their obligation to pay claimed, unjustifiably that Gibbons & Reed's equipment was no good and
that respondent had failed to perform satisfactorily.
As a matter of fact, appellants' new equipment which
also broke down was not on the job long enough to do
any good before April 15. Appellants exercised their
option upon the basis of work accomplished by Gibbons
& Reed.
With the foregoing factual background respondent
now answers each point cited as error by appellants.
However, it is noted that appellant does not challenge
the conclusions of law of the trial court, but objects only
to the facts as found by the trial court. It is axiomatic
in appellate practice that the province of the appellate
court is not to try the facts, but rather is to test the
issues of law. The general rule being stated thusly in
5 C.J.S. 550:

"* * * questions of fact in actions at law are
to be tried and determined in the court of original
jurisdiction and not in an appellate court exercising strictly the functions of a court of review,
which is in general limited to the correction of
errors of law. The probative force of evidence is
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for the consideration of the triers of the facts in
the court below, and the appellate court ordinarily
cannot consider the weight of the evidence. Similar expressions of the general principle stated are
that questions of fact determined below will not
be disturbed on appeal where the evidence is conflicting, where there was evidence sufficient to go
to the jury, where the evidence supports the action
of the court below in either one of two ways, and
where no injustice appears, and the rule applies
notwithstanding a finding of fact is apparently
against the weight or preponderance of the evidence, that different minds might arrive at opposite conclusion on a consideration of the evidence
or that a mere difference of opinion between the
reviewing court and trial judge or the jury on the
weight of the evidence exists ; * * * Where there
is any admissable or competent substantial evidence on the whole record or reasonable inference
therefrom to support the fact determined in the
lower court, the fact so determined will not be disturbed on appeal."
In Walker Bros. v. Int. Milling Co., 65 Utah 340, the
Court stated:

"This is a proceeding at law, and therefore
we can examine into the evidence only for the purpose of determining whether there is some substantial competent evidence in support of every
material and controlling finding."
Other Utah cases :

Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394;
Robinson v. Thomas, 7.5 Utah 446;
In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312;
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Knight v. Wessler, 67 Utah 354;
Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co.,
48 Utah 12.
Respondent contends that for the most part appellant's appeal seeks to retry the facts heretofore determined by the lower court and that upon the showing
of some substantial evidence supporting each of the Findings of Fact objected to by appellant, that appellant's
appeal should be denied.
APPELLANTS POINT NO. I
THE SUF'FICIENCY OF CONCLUSION OF LAW
NO. 2, to-wit:
THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID AGREEMENT HAVE NEVER PAID PLAINTIFF FOR THE EXPENSES INCURRED UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND THAT BY REASON THEREOF, PLAINTIFF HAS
BEEN DAMAGED IN THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX DOLLARS AND SEVENTYFIVE CENTS ($12,356.75') PLUS INTEREST AT SIX PERCENT (6%) FROM THE TERMINATION DATE OF SAID
CONTRACT (MARCH 18th, 1951).

Appellants predicate their case on appeal upon a
lack of performance by respondent constituting such a
complete breach of contract that respondent should not
even recover their costs incurred. An examination of the
evidence in the record shows conclusively that respondent performed in complete accordance with the agreement, up to the point when appellant abruptly and without reasonable cause terminated respondent's activities
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when only one half of the 60 day option period had
elapsed. The evidence further shows that the appellants
exercised their option with L. R. Weeks within the 60
day period prior to April15, 1952, notwithstanding that
from ~Iarch 1~ until April 15, appellants accomplished
little if any work. The exercise of said option was the
very purpose of the exploratory work undertaken by
Gibbons & Reed for appellants.
The evidence shows that Gibbons & Reed proposed
to do the exploratory and preliminary work for appellants, the cost basis for which was set forth in a proposal,
(Exhibit A). Said proposal included an estimated schedule for drilling, stripping and drifting into ore bodies,
all of which was to be accomplished subsequent to removal of overburden, construction of roads, camp facilities, etc. This work was to determine if further production of ore would be feasible and also to determine if
appellants should exercise their option with L. R. Weeks.
Said work included by reason of necessity, the construction of roads and buildings on said claims. (R. 196,
197 and 183, line 6). (R. 289, 292). The workmen were
hired by Harold Ecker who was recommended for employment by appellants. All workmen were paid by
Gibbons & Reed as a convenience to appellants and as
part of the cost of operating said project. (Dem. dep.
36) (R. 50, 56).
Work commenced on the project prior to the arrival
of Gibbons & Reed's heavy equipment. (R. 242, 243).
Gibbons & Reed's heavy equipment arrived on the job
February 19. A threatened trespass action by L. R.
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Weeks prevented earlier delivery of said heavy equipment. (R. 59, 60, 233 and 234). The work of building
roads, camp buildings, drilling, drifting and stripping
was carried forward until terminated March 12, 1951.
( R. 242, 243, 98, 196, 197, 183 line 6, 292).
Admittedly some 15.5 tons of ore were produced by
Gibbons and Reed, (R. 214) and some additional37.8 tons
were shipped off the job which could only have been produced by Gibbons and Reed, (see Exhibit 11 of appellants) (Dem. dep. 60, 72).
On April 15, 1951, appellants by reason of the work
of Gibbons & Reed, exercised their option with L. R.
Weeks, thereby fulfilling the object of their agreement
with respondent. (R. 192, 153).
Appellants thus received the benefit of Gibbons &
Reed's performance without damage. Appellants did
not introduce evidence of damage sustained.
Appellants claim that Gibbons & Reed did not drill
as many holes per day, as allegedly required in its proposal, Exhibit A. As a matter of fact, the proposal states
that the number of holes and amount of drilling was
only an estimate presumably to be accomplished subsequent to completion of the preliminary work. But
certainly as admitted by appellant Guthrie, this was not
a unit price or lump sum contract for the drilling of a
certain number of holes, (R. 43) payment to be made
per hole drilled. Yet appellant uses this false criteria
as a means of alleging failure of respondent to perform.
Respondent went down on the job in the middle of
winter, built camp buildings, and roads necessary for the
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job and then con1menced the nwving of the ore and commenced the drilling, deriYing frmn its efforts considerabl~
ore and of such quality that appellants felt safe in taking up its option to further produce said ore.
Respondent undeniably performed according to the
terms of the agreen1ent, in a reasonable and bona fide
manner, and by such performance did not breach its
contract as alleged by appellants. The lower court so
folmd and should only be reversed for a gross misapplication of these facts to the law.
Respondent seeks recovery only for those expenses
and costs actually and reasonably incurred in the performance of the contract, all of which resulted in a benefit
to appellants. No profits are claimed.
The contract is clearly one terminable at the will
of appellants. However, even a contract terminable at will
must be determined with reasonable cause. The law appears quite uniform in allowing recovery in a case such
as this where one party may and does terminate the contract after the other party has partly performed. The
element of recovery allowed is the expenditures in the
preparation and in the performance of the contract or a
part thereof. Respondent in seeking recovery accordin~
to the terms o{ the agreement is in effect merely seeking
recovery for the amount under the contract, said contract
being merely a cost basis upon which the actual costs
were determined and incurred. Respondent worked
a certain period at the rates listed in the agreement and
when the contract was terminated, the costs at these rates
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had accrued to a certain amount, which is the sum sought
in this recovery.
The fundamental principle applicable to services
rendered or the supplying of goods is stated in Vincent
v. Palmer, 19 A. 2d 183 (Md.):

"It is true that a hiring at will can be terminated at the pleasure of either party. But after an
employee has rendered services under an express
or implied contract, he is entitled to recover for
the services he has rendered."
And as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts

No. 404:
"Where under the contract a party may terminate it at his option he is not liable after termination for further transactions thereunder, but obligations which have already accrued are not affected."
Further authorities upholding respondent's position
are cited as follows:

Mile v. California Growers Wineries, 114 P. 2d 651,
(California) :
"When a contract for continuing services is
terminated after they have been rendered pursuant thereto, the employer is nevertheless liable
for the services already performed* * *"
"A contract for services or commodities cannot be terminated so as to avoid liability for services or commodities already furnished."
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U.S. v. Frank A. Beharn, 110 U. S. 329 28 Law Ed.
168:
"The party who voluntarily and wrongfully
puts an end to a contract and prevents the other
party from performing it, is estopped from denying that the injured party has not been damaged
to the extent of his actual loss and outlay fairly
incurred."
Please refer also to Katz v. Bedford, 19 Pac. 523, 1
L.R.A. 826 (California) wherein it was held that even
where the contractor wilfully failed to perform he could
recover for his expenditures upon a basis of quantum
meruit since the contract was a divisible one. This case
merely shows to what extent the courts will go in allowing recovery for work and expenditures already incurred.
Respondent did not wilfully fail to perform, and the evidence so shows.
It is clear therefore that upon a termination of the
contract under an option to terminate, the promisee must
reimburse the other party for his expenditures incurred
in performing to the extent performance was permitted
before termination. Such is the theory of this case.
However, disregard for the moment the option to
terminate and assume that respondent had breached the
contract by not performing as fully as it should. The
cases clearly hold that even though the party performing
the construction or supplying the materials has not
complied with the contract in full, but has substantially
performed the contract he should be reimbursed for his
contract price, less damages to the other party. Of
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course these cases for the most part envisage an entire
contract, not one terminable at will. But the principle is
nonetheless applicable to the instant case on appeal.
The measure of damage to appellants under all available law would only be the amount of loss sustained by
appellants, but in this case there is not one scintilla of
evidence indicating a loss of any kind sustained by the
appellant. Had respondent breached this agreement,
appellant could have then completed the contract either
by using their own forces or by entering into another
contract with a new contractor and could have billed
the respondent for the amount expended over and abovethe original contract price. This later alternative, customary in the construction industry and under contract
law, admittedly was not done by the appellants.
Under any theory advanced by the appellants and
even assuming the respondent breached its part of the
agreement, the respondent is still entitled to recover the
amount expended both in preparation for the contract
and the amount expended in the actual performance of
same, less the damage to the appellants. Since appellants
omit all evidence and proof of damage, it would appear
that the trial court properly ruled that the respondent
was at leas't entitled to its costs and expenditures in conducting and promoting the work for the appellants.
The facts clearly indicate, however, a complete and
substantial performance by respondent until the contract
was 'terminated by appellants.
In Woodward v. Fuller, 80 N. Y. 312, the New York
Court of Appeals, after pointing out that under the old
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rule ordinarily a contractor who has not fully performed
his contra:ct cannot recover the compensation provided
for in the contract, states at pages 315 and 316:
"'That there has been a relaxation of the rule,
and now on such a contract there may be a reroyery without a literal or exact performance of it.
It is now the rule, that where a builder has in good
faith intended to comply with the contract, and ha·s
substantially complied with it, although there may
be slight defects caused by inadvertence or unintentional omissions, he may recover the contract
price, less the damage on account of such defects.
The defects must not run through the whole nor
be so essential as that the object of the parties, to
have a specified amount of work done in a particular way, is not accomplished. (Phillips v. Gallant, 62 N.Y. 264)."
What constitutes substantial performance has been
a fruitful source of litigation. Substantial performance
is performance except as to unsubstantial omissions with
compensation therefor. Where the omission is slight and
unintentional, in order to prevent the hardship of a failure to recover even for that which was well done, compensation is substituted pro tanto for performance. The rule
is that where a builder has in good faith intended to comply with the contract, and has substantially complied with
it, although there may be slight defects caused by inadvertence or unintentional omissions, he may recover the
contract price, less the damages on account of such defects. Spence v. Ham, 57 N.E. 412, 51 L.R.A. 238. Crouch
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significant imperfections or deviations may be "overlooked, on the principle of de minimis." Van Clief v. Van
V echtem, 29 N.E. 1017 and 1019.
While it is difficult to state what the term substantial performance or substantial compliance as applied
to building construction contracts means, it seems that
there is substantial performance of such a contract where
all the essentials necessary to the full accomplishment of
the purpose for which the thing contracted for has been
constructed or performed with such an approximation
to complete performance that the owner obtains substantially what is called for by the contract. Imperfection in
matters of detail which do not constitute a deviation from
the general plan contemplated for the work and do not
enter into the substance of the contract do not prevent
the performance from being regarded as substantial performance. See Section 42, American Jurisprudence, page
31, volume 9.
In determining whether or not the contract has been
substantially performed controlling importance has in
some decisions been given to the cost of remedying the
omissions, defects, and deviations as compared to the contract price of the whole work. See Annotation L.R.A. 348,
and 349.
The true measure of recovery is the sum stipulated
in the agreement less the damages sustained by the failure strictly to perform. Woodruff v. Hough, 91 U.S. 596,
23 N.E. 322; Hammaker v. Schleigh, 147 Atlantic 790, 65
A.L.R. 1285; Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 23
A.L.R. 1429; Pelletier v. Masse, 143 Atlantic 609, 38
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A.L.R. 1377. Dan1ages recoverable by the owner for delay
in perforn1ance of a building contract are ordinarily the
amount of earnings or rentals lost. Hammaker v.
Schleigh, 1±7 Atlantic 790, 65 A.L.R. 1285. Where the defects are remedial without taking down and reconstructing any substantial portion of the building, the amount of
deduction from the contract price to which the owner is
entitled is the expense of making the work conform to contract requirements, Walsh Construction Co. v. Clevelwnd,
271 Fed. 701; Havorty Co. v. Jones, 197 P. 105; State v.
Riddle, 184 P. ±43; Gove v. Island City Mercantile & Mill
Co., 17 P. 740; Edmond v. Wellings, 110 P. 533. See 65
A.L.R.1285, Hammaker v. Schleigh:

"The measure of recovery in case of substantial but not exact performance of a building contract where there has been no wilful breach going
to the essence of the contract, but there have been
comparatively slight omissions and defects in performance which can be readily ascertained, measured, and compensated in damages is the contract
price less whatever sum 'Shall be required to complete the work."
A building contractor who in good faith has performed all that the contract requires although not at the
time or in the manner required is entitled to compensation for the fruits of his material and labor received by
the owner, Hammaker v. Schleigh, 147 Atlantic 790. At
page 34 of volume 9, American Jurisdiction, it is quoted:
"In accordance with the general rule a party
to a building and construction contract who has
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performed part of it according to its terms, but is
prevented by the other party from performing or
completing the contract, may recover compensation for the work performed and the materials furnished, Chicago v. Tilley, 103 U. S. 146; Valente v.
Wineberg, 67 Atlantic 369; Weis v. Devlin, 3 S.W.
726."
Forfeiture clauses in building and construction contracts are usually strictly construed against the owner
and usually a mere delay in the progress of the work will
not justify a forfeiture, Brady v. Oliver, 147 S.W. 1135.
The contractor does not, under all forms of contract, forfeit his right to recover the contract price for construction of the building by the fact that the owner takes possession and completes it under the terms of the contract
because of the contractors delay, Page 35 American
Jurisprudence, volume 9. 'See also page 37 A. J., volume
9, quoted as follows:
"It appears to be a well settled rule that if a
contractor agrees to do certain work within a specified time, and he is prevented from performing
the contract by the act or default of the other party
or by the acts of persons for whose conduct the
latter is responsible, the delay thus occasioned is
excused and the contractor may not be held liable
under the provisions for liquidated damages or
otherwise for his non-compliance with the terms
of the contract."
The American courts are united in holding that a
substantial performance of a building contract will support a recovery either on the contract or a quantum merSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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uit basis, Omaha v. Hammond, 94 U.S. 98; Woodruff v.
Hough, 91 U.S. 596, and numerous other citations found
on page 30 of volmne 9, paragraph 40, A.J.P. At page 30
of volume 9, American Jurisdiction, there are apparently
three reasons given for the rule that a substantial performance of a building contract will support recovery.
The first is that the work on a building is such that even if
rejected, the owner of the land receives the benefit of the
contractor's labor and materials which is not the case
where a chattel is constructed as the chattel may be re ·
turned. Since the owner receives the fruits of the builder's labor, it is deemed equitable to require the former
to pay for what he gets. Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 129
N.E. 889, 23 A.L.R. 1429; Leonard v. People's Tobacco
Warehouse Co., 122 S.E. 678. See Annotation 24 L.R.A.
327 and 328. The second reason is that it is next to impossible for a builder to comply literally with all the
minute specifications in a building contract, Glacius 'V.
Black, 50 N.Y. 145. The third reason is that the parties
are presumed to have impliedly agreed to do what is
reasonable under all circumstances with reference to the
subject of performance, Spence v. Ham, 57 N.E. 412, 51
L.R.A. 238.
It has been generally, though not invariably, held that
the rule which permits recovery in case of substantial performance applies even though the contract requires the
work to be performed to the satisfaction of the

owner~

his architect, or other representative, since his judgment
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trarily. Erickson v. Ward, 107 N.E. 593. Then quoting
A.J. at page 31, volume 9 as follows:
"Since the rule permitting a recovery in case
of substantial performance of a building contract
is based on equitable considerations, it is usually
stated as essential to its application that the contractor must have acted in good faith and have unintentionally failed."
Gibbons & Reed, respondent, clearly acted in good
faith and substantially performed the terms of the agreement. The foregoing cases are cited for the general
principle of recovery for partial performance of the
terms of a contract.
Appellant assumes a breach by respondent, when as
a matter of fact the lower court found that there was
no such breach. Aside from the general comment that
appellants authorities are inapplicable because based
upon a breach, which alleged breach is entirely lacking
in the present case, respondent makes the following observations about the authorities cited by appellants:
On page 9 of appellant's brief, appellants contend
that respondent falls under a quoted section of C.J.S.,
page 946. Respondent does fall under said rule, but only
to the extent of having its performance rendered impossible 'by the other party.' It should be noted that appellants interrupted respondent's performance at just the
half way point in the proposed 60 day period, claiming
that respondents could not finish the necessary work
within the next 30 day period. Appellants alarm was not
well founded, since appellants with the same supervisor,
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Harold Ecker, with the smne employees, with no large
cat until 7 days before the end of the 30 day period, (said
cat during said 7 days breaking down several times and
delaying the job), with no traxcavator until after the
April15 deadline, with appellant Grafe's own admission
that less hours were put on the job after respondent was
terminated than prior thereto (R. 208) and finally with
the uncontroverted evidence that appellants did not get
into full swing until after April 18, and did not produce
any ore on their own until July thereafter. N otwithstanding the above factors appellants determined they should
accept the option on April15.
There could not as a matter of law have been an actual
breach until after the 60 day period had elapsed and appellants had determined that respondent's performance at
that time was insufficient. Nor could there have been an
anticipatory breach at the time of termination, since such
a breach must be by affirmative acts of performer indicating clear intention to renunciate or indicating substantial performance of his contractual duties impossible,
or apparently impossible. (Restatement of Contract, Vol.
1, Section 318 (c) . ) Assuming without basis of fact, that
respondents did not completely perform:
"It is not every partial neglect or refusal to
comply with the terms of the contract by the builder which will entitle the owner to rescind, but the
default must be substantial, and of such a character as indicates an intention on the part of the
builder to abandon the contract; there must be an
actual default, unequivocal renunciation, or legal
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disability to perform on his part." 17 C.J.S. Contracts 908.
Appellant's reference on page 10 of his brief to 12
Am. J ur. 912, is not applicable, since respondent was not
given the opportunity to perform the full sixty days.
The cases cited on pages 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of appellants' brief it is true probably state adequate general
rules of law, yet said authorities do not assist in the determination of the rights under appeal in this case, either because they are not in point factually or on principle of
law.
By way of summary therefore of respondent's answer
to appellant's point No. 1, respondent alleges that the
evidence shows that respondent pursuant to an agreement
with appellants, arising out of respondent's proposal, performed the preliminary work of building camp roads and
buildings, stripping, drilling and removing of ore at the
Henry mountain claims; that appellant had the option of
terminating said agreement at any time; that appellants
did so terminate and are liable to respondent for the expenditures of respondent, incurred in its performance;
that re~pondent did not breach the agreement since respondent was not given time to finish the work; that appellants did not have cause to terminate said contract on
grounds of failure of the performance of respondent,
since the purpose of exploratory work was easily ascertainable upon the work of respondent up to the time of
termination or shortly thereafter with little if any addiional work, and was therefore not an impossibilty as is reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quired for recisiOn or a claim of anticipatory breach.
Therefore Conclusion of Law No. 2 as determined by the
trial court is not reversible, nor is the findings of fact
supporting said conclusion reversible.
APPELLANT'S POINT NO 2
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
NO. 2, to-wit:
(THAT THE PLAINTIFF) WAS TO BUILD CERTAIN
ROADS AND TRAILS (ON THE PROPERTY), (THAT THE
PLAINTIFF) PERFORMED THE PRELIMINARY AND EXPLORATORY MINING WORK WITH REFERENCE TO THE
SAID URANIUM CLAIMS HELD BY THE DEFENDANTS
IN SAID AREA IN THE HENRY MOUNTAINS, GARFIELD
COUNTY, UTAH.

In answer to appellant's Point No. 2, it is well to
again note, that it is the province of the trial court to determine the facts, their probative value and their suffi-ciency. It is not the province of the appellate court toretry the case, but merely to determine if there is substantial evidence, whether conflicting or not, to support every
material and controlling finding. Therefore respondent
in answer to this point respectfully refers to the record
replete with evidence supporting this Finding of Fact.
The following testimony by appellant Grafe is sub.
stantial evidence supporting this Finding of F'act: Pertinent portions from the record, (R. 196-198):
Mr. Mecham

"Q. Now, you knew when you came to Utah, that
there was certain preliminary work that
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A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

would have to be done with reference to this
operation down there, didn't you~
Yes, sir.
And you asked the Gibbons and Reed Company to do this preliminary work for you,
didn't you~
Well, I would like to have that made a little
more clear.
Did they do any preliminary work with reference to that operation down there~
To the mining claims~
Yes.
They did the preliminary work on the laboratory tests for you~
Yes.
Let me rephrase that question for you; see if
I can make it a little more clear: Now, you
knew before the actual production of ore took
place down there that there would have to be
some preliminary work done in that area;
perhaps building of bunkhouses and roads,
maybe, into certain claims, and so forth; you
knew that type of preliminary work had to be
done, didn't you~
Yes.
Just answer the question : Do you know
whether or not the Gibbons and Reed Company did that preliminary work for you~
They did some.
That's what I wanted; you knew bunkhouses
had to be built, didn't you, or did you~
Well, I assume so, yes.
Would this refresh your memory-this agreement of March 8, indicating the building and
equipping bunkhouses and equipping 'chow-
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~-\..

house.' Did you have that understanding with
Gibbons and Reed'
Yes."

Please refer to the following additional evidence in
this regard :
Appellant Grafe's testimony, (R. 208 and 183);
Harold Ecker, the supervisor on the job, (R. 242,
243).
Appellant's agent Ludwig, (R. 289).
Appellant Guthrie stated that said contract was an
oral con tract, ( R. 43).
:Mr. Jones was sent on a preliminary trip down to
the claims at the request of appellant Grafe, (R. 54).
Engineer Robert Deming, who was on the job all of
the time testified as to the preliminary work, (Dem. dep.
62).
It is apparent from the above evidence that the oral
agreement the subject of this case included the construction of the necessary roads and campbuildings, and that
therefore the trial court's finding in this regard is not so
grossly erroneous as is necessary before the appellate
court can assume the burden of determining the facts.
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 3
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
No. 5, to-wit:
THAT AS A FURTHER CONDITION OF SAID AGREEMENT, THE PLAINTIFF PLACED ON ITS PAYROLL, AT
THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANTS, THE NECESSARY
WORKMEN TO CONDUCT THE PRELIMINARY AND EXSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PLORATORY MINING WORK, ALL OF WHICH WAS DONE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAID AGREEMENT.

Answer to appellants point No. III is found in appellants answer, paragraph four (R. 5) wherein they admit
the allegations of respondents complaint, paragraph
three (R. 1).
APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 4
THE SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
No.6, to-wit:
THAT THE DEFENDANTS IN BREACH OF SAID
AGREEMENT REFUSED TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF FOR
THE WORK PERFORMED.

Appellant complains that respondent breached the
contract first and that appellants could not thereafter
be guilty of a breach. As pointed out under respondent's
argument under Point I, appellants cannot claim a breach
of the agreement by respondent since appellants, 30
days before completion time, prevented respondent
from continuing performance. Appellants cannot claim
an anticipatory breach as shown under Point No. I.
Appellants cannot claim an abandonment of the performance by respondent since the very elements thereof
are lacking.
"To permit an abandonment, it is necessary
that the failure of performance go to the substance of the contract, and it would seem that,
where there is no distinct refusal by the party
in default to be bound by the contract in the
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future, his conduct must be such as to show that
he does not intend to fulfill its obligations. However, the default need not be such as to defeat
the whole purpose of the contract." 17 C.J.S.
980.
"Strictly an "anticipatory breach" of a contract is one committed before the time has come
when there is a present duty of perforn1ance,
and it is the outcome of words or acts evincing
an intention to refuse performance in the future."
17 C.J.S. 973.
See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Costin, 116 S.W.
2d 894.
Prior to the end of the 60 day period, i.e., April 15,
there could have been no breach of the contract. "A
contract may be conditioned to be executed or a debt
may be made payable at a future time, and here the
specified time must elapse before the performance of
the contract or the debt becomes absolutely due." 17
C.J.S. 938.
It is uniformly held that where performance is to
be done by a certain time, the performance need not be
apportioned equally over the whole period, just so the
performance is complete on the last day, hour or minute,
set as the time limit. See Hale v. Trout, 35 Cal. 229 and
Lone Star Salt Co. v. Texas Short Line R. Co., 90 S.W.
863, 3 L.R.A.N.S. 828, and Oriental Trading Co. v.
Houser, 151 P. 242, 87 Wash. 184.
In view of the above argument and authorities, it
is readily apparent that respondent committed neither
a breach nor anticipatory breach at any time. Time for
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payment in a contract where the time is not specifically
de signa ted is legally inferred to be at the completion
of the work. Lavan v. Cowan, 291 P. 877, Gustafson v.
Cullen, 283 P. 1087. Therefore, since payment has not
been received (R. 67) appellants are in breach of their
implied agreement to pay for the services rendered by
Gibbons & Reed.
Appellants on page 20 of their brief make reference
to negligent and wilful conduct. In as much as there
is nothing in this case eoncerning either negligence or
wilful breach, said reference is not in point.
Appellant makes reference on page 21 to approval
of performance. Respondent does not question the right
of appellant to terminate the contract. The contract
was so entered into with that understanding. The agreement was entered into with the express option that
appellants could at any time stop performance by Gibbons & Reed. Appellants, however, cannot terminate
said contract and then unjustifiably claim that Gibbons
& Reed breached the contract, and thus should not be

paid for their expenses.
Therefore, appellants argument on page 21 does
not have any particular application to the instant problem.
In summary therefore it may be stated that the lower
court was clearly justified in law and fact in entering
its findings of Fact No.6.
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~\PPELL~-\.NT'S

POINT NO. 5

THE SlTFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
No.6, to-wit:
"THAT THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF PERFORMANCE OF SAID AGREEMENT TO THE
TERMINATION THEREOF HAD PERFORMED BONA
FIDEDLY AND IN REASONABLE AND COMPLETE CONFORMANCE WITH THE TERMS OF SAID AGREEMENT."

For the most part the answer to appellants point
No. 5 is found in respondents answer to appellants point
No. 1. However, brief comment should be made upon
counsel for appellants statement: "Here we have a highly
specialized proposal to perform three distinct and clearcut operations, to-wit:" * * * This statement does not
conform to appellants testimony and answers to interrogatories set forth in the record.
Appellant Guthrie stated that the contract was an
oral agreement (R. 43) and it was not a unit price or
lump sum contract. Further, appellants in their answers
to plaintiff's interrogatories, claimed said proposal was
an estimate, question 19:

"Q. Was there any item listed in your Exhibit
A to which defendants did not agree~ (R. 21).
A. Defendants did not agree on any item in the
proposal but merely relied upon the proposal
as an estimate of ultimate costs." Exhibit
13.
The wording of the written proposal itself, shows
that the number of holes, etc., is an estimated performSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ance (Exhibit A). Notwithstanding the above facts,
appellant now attempts to make this Exhibit A the only
part of the contract, and in direct contradiction to its
terms attempts to make this a contract for a certain
sum of money for the drilling of a certain number of
holes. Appellants' position in regard to the contract
appears to vacillate at will and in accordance with the
desired result of the minute.
Proposal Exhibit A, as has been heretofore shown
by the evidence, was a cost basis upon which the costs
of the operation could be predicated. Respondent commenced such operation, incurred costs such as rental
rates and labor and material costs before being termin··
ated by appellants, and now makes demand upon appellants for its costs incurred in accordance with the agreement and the rates included therein.
There is no question but that all parties concerned
knew of the purpose of the agreement between appellant
and respondents; that purpose being the determination
of the advisability of exercising an option concerning
said claims on the 15th day of April. As heretofore
pointed out under the answer to point No. 1 and point
No. 4, appellants determined the advisability of exercising the option, almost entirely upon the results of the
work done by Gibbons & Reed. There is substantial
evidence supporting this Finding of F·act and under the
law heretofore cited under respondent's answer to points
1 and 4, appellants position under this point is not tenable.
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APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 6
"THE ALLEGED ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT
ENTERING A FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION AND
JUDGMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT RESPONDENT FAILED, NEGLECTED AND REFUSED TO PERFORM UNDER
PROPOSAL (EXHIBIT A) AND THAT RESPONDENTS
CONDUCT OF ITS OPERATIONS WAS SO INEFFICIENT
AND INEFFECTIVE BY REASON OF WORN AND BROKEN
EQUIPMENT AND POOR MANAGEMENT THAT APPELLANTS WERE OBLIGED TO TERMINATE."

In answer to appellants point No. 6, respondent
contends that this alleged finding which appellants desire
the Supreme Court to insert is not within the province
of an appellate court but rather is a matter for the trial
court. Further, this alleged finding is obviously in direct.
contradiction to those Findings of Fact which the lower
court did find in the trial of this case to be substantially
supported by sufficient evidence and which findings respondent has discussed previously in this brief. Therefore the requested Finding under this point No. 6 is
without basis unless all of the Findings of the lower
court are reversed.
However, brief answer, at the risk of repetition,
shall be made concerning appellants reference to worn
and broken equipment and poor management. It is
believed that ample answer has heretofore been made
to that portion of appellants' point referring to failure,
neglect and refusal to perform.
Appellant has attempted to use for an excuse for
terminating the contract and taking it over themselves,
the fact that on March 12, when appellant visited the
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job, the D-8 cat and the air compressor were broken.
Appellants predicate their position on the false assumption that equipment should not break down at all on such
an operation as this. Respondent, however, contends that
on all jobs there is the probability that the equipment
shall need repairs. This is borne out by the fact that even
the new equipment which appellants brought onto the
job broke down several times in the short week it was on
the job prior to April 15 (Dem. dep. 63). When the cat
and compressor broke down on March 12, Mr. Boyer,
the heavy duty equipment mechanic asked for permission
to procure the parts (R. 102), knowing that it would only
take a short time with the parts and to repair the cat
(R. 115, 116). Appellants refused to send for the parts
(R. 114), or to request Gibbons & Reed to make the repair.
The air compressor only required fifteen minutes to
repair (R. 286). The usual parts were on hand for such
a construction job, according to the testimony of said
mechanic and according to Mr. Deming. (R.101, 115, 116)
(Dem. dep. 37).
Apparently Mr. Ecker, who as is evident, was not
familiar with a D-8 cat nor who was not a mechanic
(R. 249, 250), Mr. Guthrie, who admittedly was a refrigeration engineer (R. 273) and apparently was not familiar with the cat (R. 275), and had not been on the
job before (R. 274), and Mr. Grafe, who did not know
the necessary parts (R. 175), all were on the job March
12 and seeing the cat broken down, ordered the job
stopped, not knowing the extent of the repairs needed
and not being concerned therewith. Both Mr. Boyer
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and :Jlr. Den1ing· testified that the operations with Gibbons & Reed equip1nent were normal for such a job.
(R. 98, 115) (Dem. dep. 62).
The D-S cat had been inspected at the Salt Lake
shops of Gibbons & Reed, having just come from a job
where it was being used in Washington. (R. 104).
From the above evidence the lower court correctly
found that the respondent supplied proper equipment for
the job and in so doing performed the contract bona
fidedly until stopped by appellants.
A.ppellants contention of poor management is entirely inconsistent with the facts in the case and in particularly \\ith the testimony of appellants themselves,
and therefore said contention is without any basis whatsoever, either factual or inferential.
Appellant Grafe himself testified that appellants had
no complaint with the personnel (R. 188) and in fact
retained all personnel, including the Eckers, Deming
and laborers on the job. (R. 244, 158, 184), (Dem. dep.
37). The supervision of the job was in the hands of Mr.
Ecker, to whom appellants had no objection. After the
termination of March 12, the very same employees and
supervision stayed on the job doing the same work, but
using some different pieces of equipment when said
equipment ultimately arrived.
Therefore, it cannot be the prerogative of the appellants to now complain of the management, even if they
had cause therefor. Such a claim is as superficial as
appellants alleged grounds for terminating the contract.
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The cases cited by appellant under this point all
appear to go the point that parties must show performance in order to recover on the contract. The answer to
all such cases is found in the Findings of Fact, determined by the lower court, to the effect that respondent
did perform. Unless such findings are entirely unsupported by evidence in the lower court the findings will
stand. Such evidence has been pointed out in respondent's previous answers in this brief.
APPELLANT'S. POINT NO. 7 AND 8
"THE ALLEGED ERROR IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS
"B" AND "C", THE OPERATING LEDGER AND PAYROLL
JOURNAL OF RESPONDENT."

Again, under this point, appellant is under a misapprehension as to the nature of the agreement entered
into. Appellants apparently contend that the agreement
was a unit price or lump sum contract for the performance of three distinct operations and no more. As heretofore pointed out under respondent's answer to previous
points, the proposal was for a continuing performance
at a certain proposed cost, the basis of which cost was
set forth in the written proposal, but that the contract
was an oral agreement encompassing other elements than
the mere cost basis of the proposal (Exhibit A).
Respondent did not make this proposal upon the
unit cost which appellant seems to argue, i.e., the work
was not undertaken at so many dollars per hole drilled,
at so many dollars per tons acquired from drifting, etc.
The proposal does not so state. The terms of the cost
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basis are stated on the proposal and it is clearly evirlent
that it is a cost basis for the use and rental of equipment
and carrying the payroll of the workmen.
~-\ppellants in point No. 7 contend that respondents have not proven their damages, i.e., the expenditures incurred on this job. Appellants by their argument
would seem to require that one person be on the job,
check on the perforn1ance, prepare the time cards, pay
the 1nen, receive the invoices, pay for the materials,
then prepare and keep the daily ledger sheets for the
corporation itself. Such a position is not logical nor in
any respects reasonable, nor does such a position conform to the accepted practice in our modern society or
to the law governing the same.
Respondent proved the performance of the contract.
See the statement of facts and references to record at
the beginning of this brief. The trial court so determined
in its Findings of Fact. As shown by Mr. Deming, who
was hired and stayed on the job to keep account of the
expenses, the expenses from the field for said performance, were currently and daily sent into the office of
Gibbons & Reed, (Dem. dep. 66-69) as were the costs
incurred by Mr. Ecker for materials (R. 246). Thereafter
Mr. Ed. Shea, Assistant Secretary Treasurer of Gibbons
& Reed, testified concerning the original ledger sheet and
the original payroll, that said documents were prepared
currently with the receipt of the invoice or statement of
account. (R. 107-112). Thus documentary evidence was
admitted in evidence by the Court in the form of the
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counts payable to said project (Exhibit B), and the
original company payrolls covering salaries of the workmen on the project (Exhibit C). Appellants subjected
the witness to cross examination on both documents,
raising three questions with reference to the general
ledger sheets, concerning (a) The item of $50.00 paid
for serving an attachment, which item respondent agreed
to strike from the costs, (b) Rental of certain equipment
from the Folger Equipment, and (c) Two items of salaries and expense of George Jones and Pat Gibbons.
These items were identified by Mr. Jones. (R. 142, 143).
It is conclusively shown by the above evidence, contrary to appellants' contention, that respondent proved
performance of the contract, proved the expenditures
incurred and the transmittal of same to the office and
proved the daily tabulation of said costs to determine
the total expenditure for the job.
Having established the factual support for the damages incurred, respondent respectfully submits the following authorities, supporting the admissibility of the
records as submitted by respondent for the proof of the
expenditures incurred :
LEDGER SHEETS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS ORIGINAL ENTRIES OF BOOK ACCOUNT'S UNDER SHOP-BOOK RULE. On Page 1072,
Paragraph 567a of Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases.
Fourth Edition, it is quoted as follows:

"* * * This rule has been extended so as to
admit proof of such books and entries after a
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showing of authenticity, where the person who
Inade the entry although still alive appears not
to be aYailable as a witness. And books are held
to be admissible where the entries have been made
in the regular course of business by the shopkeeper hiinself. Accordingly, it has become the
established rule that books or entries therein
zchich ha &·e been kept or made by the shopkeeper
himself or by his clerk or agent in the regular
course of business are admissible to prove the
sale, delivery, or price of goods, performance of
work, labor or services, or in some instances even
other matters than accounts which are shown by
such entries.
"While in some of the States the old ShopBook Rule has been enlarged and extended without the enactment of any statute, Legislatures
have very generally enacted laws under which
business records and contemporaneous entries
therein are admissible. Many of the statutes not
being limited to books of account and entries
therefrom extended to records and entries generally which are made in the regular course of
business. In view of the fact that the purpose of
such legislation is to afford a more workable rule
of evidence in the proof of business transactions
under existing business conditions, it has been
held that the statute should be construed liberally * * * ."
On Page 1077 of Jones on Evidence:
"Account books are properly used for the
purpose of showing contemporaneous charges for
goods or materials furnished or services rendered
in the course of dealing between the parties, and
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also to serve as evidence of such facts, and of
the promise implied by law to pay therefor* * *."
On Page 1078 of Jones on Evidence:
"Although books are admittedly more satisfactory where it appears that they have been
kept in the form of daily entries or debits and
credits in a day book or journal, this is not
essential; they may have been kept in the form
of a ledger, if this is the general mode, in which
the party keeps his books-provided that the
entries are original entries. The book may take
the form of a timebook evidencing, not only the
labor of the Plaintiff, but that of his apprentice
or assistant as well.
"But the book should be a regular and usual
account book such as explains itself and appears
on its face to create a liability by reason of an
account with the party against whom it is offered
and not a mere memorandum for some other
purpose * * •."
On Page 1079 of Jones on Evidence:
"* * * While mere loose sheets of paper have
been held not to be admissible, a different case is
presented where it appears that the disputed
account was kept in accordance with modern business practices, including the use of loose-leaf
business books as books of original entry * * *."
On Page 1082 of Jones on Evidence:
"* * * Much must be left to the discretion of
the judge who presides at the trial because having the books before him and understanding all
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the circumstances of the case, he is best able to
decide upon all questions involving the fairness
and regularity of the entries sought to be proved

* • *"
At the bottmn of Page 1082 of Jones on Evidence:
"Entries in books are not ordinarily adinissible in evidence unless they appear to have been
made in the regular course of business or as an
incident of the party's system of keeping his
accounts "' "' "'."
On Page 1089 of Jones on Evidence:

"* * * The books must be produced in Court
so as to be available for inspection by the adverse
party, and in order that their credibility may be
tested by their appearance or by the cross-examination of the party."
The case of Corkan vs. Rutter, 69 Atlantic 954 was
an action for work and material upon repairs performed
for the defendant, it appeared that the workmen were
required to enter upon blank forms the amount of work
and material consumed during specific periods of time,
such slips constituting the basis for day book entries.
It was held that the books of account made upon the
basis of such slips were admissible in evidence without
extraneous evidence to support them.
The reasoning of the Court in arriving at this conclusion is expressed in the following summary of the rule
applicable to such situations:
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"We think it clear that if no slips at all had
been used, these books would be entirely competent upon a system of workmen reporting orally
to the bookkeeper the number of hours consumed
and materials used. Business could not go on
unless the employer could rely on the statements
of employees in such matters; and every book
account in a business of any magnitude is necessarily made up in large measure of entries based
on reports of employees. The system of making
such reports in writing has the manifest advantages, among many of keeping check on the workmen, avoiding disputes between them and the
employer by making a permanent record of the
work and facilitating the work of the office clerks,
but we fail to see that the adoption of such a
system requires the production and offer of slips
as imparting any competency to the books or
limiting their availability as evidence * * *."
"The fact that a party's books of account
are kept in loose-leaf form or on card index files,
will not necessarily operate to exclude same from
use at the trial; provided it appears that the
books contain original entries and are contemporaneous with the transaction to which they
relate. Douglas vs. Parker, 235 Pacific 148; Polus
vs. Conner, 176 N.E. 234; New York Motor Car
Company vs. Greenfield, 145 New York Supp. 33."
In Wylie vs. Bushnell, 115 N.E. 618, the Supreme
Court of Illinois stated:
"No special form * * * of keeping books is
required. The question of their competency and
sufficiency must be determined by the appearance
and character of the account, regard being had
to the character of the work and the qualifications
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ordinarily required in keeping books of account
as to such business. Separate scraps of paper
have been admitted in evidence as books when
sworn to as such. A notched stick has been held
to be admissible as a book of original entries
where the accuracies of the entries was satisfactorily tested by comparison with an account
with notched sticks some time previous. Sheets
from a looseleaf ledger system accounts, containing the original entries are when properly identified, admissible in evidence. The ma.terial, form,
or construction of the book oIf ered in evidence
as a book of original entries, is unimportant. The
manner of keeping accounts is the important consideration. If they are in such form and so preserved as to fairly show the true statement of the
accounts between the parties, and can, under the
rules governing the making of such en tries, be
fairly held to be original entries, that is all that
is required. To hold that they must be in a bound
book form, all in cases is giving more importance
to form than to substance. The vital question in
such cases is whether the entries offered are
original charges, are true, and have been made
at or about the time of transaction."
Similarly, it was held in Lewis vs. England, 14
Wyoming 128, 82 Pacific 869, that:

uThe law prescribes no regular mode or
method in which accounts must be kept in order
to make them competent as evidence. The question of competency must be determined by the
appeara.nce and character of the book, regard
being had to the degree of education of the party,_
the nature of his business, the manner of his
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rounding circumstances. The material, form,
construction of the book offered in evidence as
the book of original entry are unimportant, provided such book be capable of perpetuating a
record of events, and the entries are made in
conformity with the general rules governing the
admissibility of such entries."
The prevailing view is to admit looseleaf records
when properly identified and authenticated and when
shown to be a part of a ledger which conforms to the
broad rules of books of accounts kept in the regular
course of business. Wyle vs. Bushnell, 115 N.E. 618. In
the case of Crump vs. Bank of Toccoa, 153 S.E. 531, the
court pointed out in discussing the admissibility of ledger
sheets:
"What was introduced was not really a book
in the ordinary sense, but consisted of detachable sheets taken from a looseleaf ledger, and
contained a record of the account between the
parties. These documents, however, will be treated as a book and for the convenience herein will
be called a book since such leaves or sheets may
be removed from the ledger containing them and
introduced in evidence upon the same footing and
under the same principles as are applicable to
the introduction of books of account, where the
proper foundation of such evidence is otherwise
laid. It is immaterial whether the original entrie~
of the account be made in a book or on separate
sheets of paper, the requirement to this matter
being that the documents shall comprise an account of the dealings between the parties and
shall be primary and original."
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In the case of Grahm vs. Work, reported at 141 N.W.
4:2S, the Supren1e Court of Iowa, held as follows:
"The rnanner of keeping the accounts is the
important consideration. If they are in such forrn
and so preserved as to identify as to carry to the
mind the conclusion that the true state of accounts
between the parties is therein shown from the
original entries, to hold that they must be in
bound book form is giving importance to form
rather than to substance. The vital question in
such cases is whether the entries offered are the
original charges, are true, and proven to have
been made at or near the time of transaction."
The evidence clearly discloses :
The books of account admitted rn evidence
were honestly kept.
(2) The ledger sheets and the payroll sheets are
books of original entry.
(3) The entries on the payroll sheets were made
in the regular course of business or employment.
(4) The entries on the payroll sheets and ledger
sheets were made contemporaneously with the transactions.
( 5) The entrant and the person supervising the
entries was called as a witness and testified as to the
original entries and the time which the entries were made.
(6) The entrant testified that the books were correctly kept.
(1)

With further reference to Appellant's contention
that Respondent was to perform on actual cost basis and
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that the ledger sheets might have included items of profit,
we respectfully submit that the testimony and evidence
in the record shows that the parties entered into the
instant agreement and that included therein were certain
figures on the cost which Gibbons & Reed Company
would incur in doing the work. The testimony shows
that no profit was included therein, since profits were
anticipated from future work to be performed subsequent
to this contract. Appellants agreed to these rates from
the very inception of the contract and the evidence so
shows. The Appellants, did not at any time object to
these rates or notify Gibbons & Reed that the rates were
not satisfactory. The charges for this work were based
upon the agreed rates, and the record adequately shows
the ledger sheets to he evidence of the agreed costs of
this job.
In conclusion therefore, respondent believes that
Appellants contention as to the admissibility of the
ledger sheets and the payroll and as to the probative
value of same is founded upon a misinterpretation of
the facts as shown in the record. Respondent maintains
that the facts and authorities cited show more than an
adequate foundation for the admissibility of the ledger
sheets and payrolls. Respondent further believes that the
probative value of said documents cannot be seriously
questioned, inasmuch as they are evidence of the amount
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of costs, at the rate agreed upon by appellants and respondents, which respondent incurred in the performance
of the exploratory work for appellants and were all subjected to inspection and cross-examination.

APPELLANT'S POINT NO. 9
"THE SUFFICIENCY OF CONCLUSION OF LAW No. 3,
TO-WIT: THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
ANY RELIEF ON THEIR COUNTER-CLAIM AND THAT
THE SAME SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE."

In answer to appellants point No. 9, it is sufficient
to state that the lower court properly ruled that appellants were not entitled to recover on their counterclaim.
Appellants submitted no evidence upon which recovery
could be granted and failed to offer any evidence of
damage, and failed in all other particulars to sustain
their burden of proof. Appellants' failure to show damages obviously results from the fact that appellants suffered no damage. Appellants exercised their option, with
very little, if any, work required after respondent was
ordered off the job. Appellants received the benefit of
said option, of the ore produced by respondents, of thP
roads constructed and of the camp buildings built. As a
matter of fact appellants received only benefits from this
agreement.
CONCLUSION
Appellants and respondent entered into an oral sixty
day agreement based upon certain cost rates, the purpose
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of which was to permit appellants to determine if they
should enter into an operating agreement on said properties with a Mr. Weeks. Appellants in accordance with
their right to terminate the agreement, did so, at the half
way point. Appellants could not have terminated on the
grounds of respondent's breach, since respondent still
had half of the time left in which to perform. Appellants
could not have terminated upon the theory of anticipatory
breach, since from the facts it is evident that respondent's performance was nearly complete and could have
been completed shortly thereafter and within the time
limit of the sixty day option. The only theory upon
which appellants could terminate was merely upon their
right to do so as set forth in the proposal, Exhibit "A."
Upon such a termination the law is uniform that respondents are entitled to their costs expended to that point of
termination. Respondent performed in a bona fide manner the work agreed upon and did so in accordance with
the proposed rates and procedures. The benefits of respondent's efforts have been accepted and retained by
appellants. Respondent's, by the very terms of the agreement, ate not seeking profits but merely demand to be
made whole, for work and service rendered.
Appellants in this appeal have raised no issues of
law, but have predicated their appeal entirely upon an
alleged failure of the facts in the case. It is belie-red
that upon the showing of substantial evidence supporting
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the lower court's findings that appellants' appeal is rendered nugatory. Respondent has pointed out the evidence
upon which the lower court based its judgrnent and
appellant has entirely failed to show any lack of such
evidence. Therefore respondent respectfully submits that
the judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE AND MECHAM,
Attorneys for Respondent
ALLAN E.

MECHAM

ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
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